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Abstract The objective of this article is to estimate the value
of ‘follow-on’ or ‘me-too’ drugs from the payer, industry and
societal perspectives. Since me-too drugs do not bring addi-
tional clinical benefits, they are only valuable to payers if they
save costs. An empirical model was constructed to identify the
factors affecting whether a me-too drug results in cost savings
to the pharmaceutical budgets of payers. These factors includ-
ed the intensity of promotional spending, price discount and
time to entry. Twenty-seven second-entrant products with
limited differentiation were identified; their launch dates
ranged from 1988 to 2009. On average, me-too drugs launch
2.5 years after the first entrant, with 20 % more promotional
investment, and capture 38 % of market share within 4 years.
Peak market share is significantly affected by share of voice
(p<0.001) but not price discount (p=0.77). Launch delay was
significant in terms of reducing both market share (p<0.001)
and price (p<0.05). With a launch price 15 % below the
incumbent, cumulative savings from use of a me-too drug
peak at over $1000 million, but decrease rapidly after the first
entrant becomes generic and only amount to $450 million
over the me-too drug’s lifecycle. With a price discount less
than 10 %, cumulative savings are negative over the life of the
me-too drug. Therefore, me-too drugs may be cost saving in
the short term, but can represent a cost in the longer term.
From a societal perspective, me-too drugs always decrease the
economic surplus if they do not grow the market. If me-too
drugs grow the market by 20%, they augment, on average, the
economic surplus only if the variable costs (including promo-
tional investment) do not increase by more than $300 million
per year.
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1 Introduction
Over recent decades, numerous new treatments have been
developed for diverse medical conditions such as hyperten-
sion, hypercholesterolemia, cancer and HIV. Between 1990
and 2004, 431 new molecular entities were approved by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [1]. Some com-
pounds were genuine innovations, while others provided
limited incremental therapeutic value over existing prod-
ucts. The former are often referred to as ‘breakthrough’
drugs, ‘first-in-class’ or ‘innovators’, while the latter are
called ‘incrementally modified’ drugs, ‘follow-on’ drugs
or, more often, ‘me-too’ drugs. In fact, the FDA assessed
that 183 (42 %) of the 431 new molecular entities were
“significant improvement[s] compared to marketed prod-
ucts” and the remaining 248 (58 %) appeared to “have
therapeutic qualities similar to those of one or more already
marketed” [1].
Given their limited incremental clinical benefits and their
number, understanding the value of me-too drugs is critical
for pharmaceutical companies when making research and
development (R&D) decisions. As development costs can
reach approximately $800 million per drug, pharmaceutical
companies must often make trade-off decisions in their
R&D portfolios [2]. Forecasting the potential of me-too
drugs is important for informing resource-allocation deci-
sions. Understanding the value of such drugs is also critical
for payers (e.g. health insurers) when making reimburse-
ment decisions; for physicians and patients when electing
treatment choice and allocating healthcare spending; and for
society when improving efficiency by directing healthcare
resources to the most cost-effective uses.
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1.1 Background
Me-too drugs lack innovation compared with existing ther-
apeutic options and have been widely criticised in the gen-
eral press [3] and the scientific literature on a number of
grounds. For example, it has been argued that they divert
R&D investment away from diseases with higher unmet
needs [4] and may even damage innovation by reducing
incentives to pioneer new therapeutic classes because me-
too drugs curb the innovator’s profits [5]. Pharmaceutical
companies have been criticised for increasing spending on
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of me-too drugs,
which has been perceived as tending to promote drugs over
a healthy lifestyle and may lead to overconsumption [6].
Follow-on drugs may also limit the penetration of generics
after the first-in-class drug is no longer protected by patent
[7]. Me-too drugs can significantly augment expenditure
growth. 80 % of the increase in drug expenditures between
1996 and 2003 in British Columbia could be explained by
the use of drugs without clinical benefits over older drugs,
most of which had lost patent [8].
Although increased competition from me-too drugs
might be expected to lead to a decrease in price, this has
not always occurred, which has led to criticism of the drug
companies [9]. Azoulay found that in the histamine H2-
receptor antagonist market, Tagamet’s price increased when
Zantac, its first competitor, entered the market [10]. Addi-
tionally, Tagamet and Zantac prices continued to increase
when other competitors were launched [10]. However, this
study failed to account for the fact that potentially a higher
price increase might have occurred without any new
competition.
Conversely, it can be argued that me-too drugs have
numerous positive effects. For example, they may provide
improvements (albeit marginal) in treatment for some pa-
tients; there is evidence that for some diseases, patients do in
fact respond differently to me-too drugs. For instance, al-
though numerous randomized trials showed no significant
differences in clinical effectiveness between selective sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants, more than
half of the patients who do not respond to one SSRI antide-
pressant benefit from another drug in the same class [11].
Notwithstanding the example of the H2-receptor antagonist
drugs discussed above, me-too drugs are typically intro-
duced at a discount in the US and subsequent price increases
are lower when there are more branded substitutes in the
market [12]. Lexchin (2006) analysed 33 new me-too drugs
in Canada and found that the mean introductory price was
8.5 % lower than the price of the most expensive brands
[13]. Furthermore, payers are likely to use new entrants as a
means to extract better value from the class via formulary
management tools. For example, in a survey conducted in
the USA most health plans stated that they would demand a
20 % discount compared with Advair to grant Dulera a
favourable formulary position [14].
Although the name ‘me-too’ implies imitation, the exis-
tence of me-too drugs is more often due to parallel devel-
opment [15]. Parallel development may stimulate
competition to become the first company to launch a break-
through product; this, in turn, could potentially accelerate
development times and enhance product profiles [16]. Me-
too drugs may also augment disease awareness through
increased promotion such as DTC advertising. Such an
increase in awareness may increase diagnosis rates, improve
compliance and lead to better health outcomes. In addition,
by affecting the first entrants’ profits, the introduction of
me-too drugs could potentially force innovators to invest
more heavily in R&D to preserve revenue and profit growth.
Although it has been argued that the development of me-too
drugs diverts R&D investment away from diseases with
higher unmet needs [4], it can also be argued that me-too
drugs generate profits for manufacturers that can then be
reinvested in R&D for disease states with high unmet needs.
Given the wide range of opinions regarding me-too
drugs, an objective analysis of their impact is warranted.
An analysis was conducted of the impact of me-too drugs
across a wide range of therapeutic areas from the perspec-
tives of pharmaceutical companies, payers and society. A
me-too drug can offer cost savings to payers if introduced at
a discount but can also increase costs if it has a higher price
than the generic products once the pioneer loses the patent.
The key objective of this paper is to identify whether the
cost savings generated from a lower introductory price ex-
ceed the extra costs due to the slower adoption of generics
after the pioneer loses patent. Additionally, the impact of
me-too drugs on economic surplus is assessed.
In the next Section, the factors influencing the success
and potential cost-savings of me-too drugs will be reviewed.
Next, the data and the model used in the analysis will be
explained and validated. Finally, the impact for payers, the
pharmaceutical industry and society will be discussed.
2 Methods
2.1 Factors influencing the success of (me-too) drugs
Marketing literature has long identified that order of entry
and quality of new products impact market success [17, 18].
Fischer and colleagues (2010) analysed the sales of phar-
maceutical drugs and showed that a drug’s quality increases
peak sales and its order of entry reduces peak sales [19].
They also showed that a firm’s own market expenditures
positively impact sales while price had no impact. The
impact of competitive marketing expenses is mixed in the
literature. Prins and Verhoef (2007) found that promotional
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investment spent by competitors reduces time-to-adoption
[20] while Fischer and Albers (2010) [21] estimated that
competitive marketing investments may have a category
building effect and increase the sales of all brands in the
market.
In this article, any given firm’s expenditures and compet-
itive expenditures are combined to calculate shares of pro-
motional investment. Quality was not a relevant variable
since it is similar between me-too drugs and innovators.
The delay between launch of the innovator molecule and
that of the me-too drug was used instead of order of entry.
Additional factors considered were the duration of patent
protection, price and the influence of managed care
organisations.
2.2 Data sources
A number of governmental and proprietary datasets were
used for the analysis, including:
1. Product evaluations by the Transparency Commission
of the French national health authority – Haute Autorité
de la Santé (HAS) [22];
2. US National Prescription Audit by Intercontinental
Marketing Services (IMS), which measures the flow of
prescriptions dispensed by pharmacies [23];
3. Promotional audit data for the USA from SDI Health,
which tracks physician/nurse detailing, meetings and
events, DTC advertising, and advertising in professional
medical journals [24];
4. First Databank’s National Drug Data File, which pro-
vides wholesaler acquisition costs (WACs) for the USA,
also called ex-factory price [25]. The WAC is the list
price paid by wholesalers or distributors to manufac-
turers before any discounts, rebates or allowances.
2.3 Model framework
2.3.1 Product selection
The order of market entry and level of differentiation were
estimated for the major products manufactured by the larg-
est pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson,
Roche, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi, AstraZeneca,
Abbott Laboratories, Merck & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Eli Lilly, Boehringer Ingelheim, Amgen, Genentech,
NovoNordisk, Bayer,Takeda, Astellas, Daiichi Sankyo)
using 2007, 2008 and 2009 annual reports. The annual
reports provided information for products launched as far
back as 1991. To avoid selection bias (namely only
screening the most successful products of the major compa-
nies), all new molecular entities approved by the FDA from
19991 to 2007 were also analysed [26]. The dependent
variable was the peak share over the first 4 years and recent
launches could not be included. Finally, the branded ver-
sions of linisopril (Privinil and Zestril) were included in the
sample since both brands were clinically undifferentiated. In
the base model, Prinivil was the me-too of Zestril. In the
Section 3.2., Zestril was the me-too of Prinivil. The analysis
was limited to second-to-market drugs available in the USA.
Product differentiation was assessed based on Améliora-
tion du Service Médical Rendu (ASMR; evaluation of ther-
apeutic benefit) ratings used by the French Transparency
Commission [22]. These ratings are an objective measure of
the product’s medical added value versus existing compar-
ators, classified in five categories: ASMR I (therapeutic
breakthrough), ASMR II (important improvement in terms
of efficacy or safety), ASMR III (modest improvement in
terms of efficacy or safety), ASMR IV (minor improvement
in terms of efficacy or safety) and ASMR V (no improve-
ment). The French ASMR is not the only system that eval-
uates drugs by assigning a rating. For instance, the German
IQWiG (Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im
Gesundheitswesen) rating system also attempts to establish
qualitative assessments of incremental value. The French
rating system has several advantages. Firstly, all products
in the sample had an ASMR rating at launch [27]. This is not
the case with the German system since IQWiG was founded
in 2004. Furthermore, French ratings are specifically
designed to inform reimbursement and pricing decisions.
Finally, they provide more information than the FDA ratings
which are only distributed among 3 categories (priority
review, standard review, orphan designation). In Sec-
tion 4.5., the impact of using the FDA instead of the HAS
ratings is analysed.
A product was classified as a me-too drug if it belonged
to the same therapeutic class as a previous entrant and if its
ASMR rating was IV or V. A second entrant was also
classified as a me-too drug if it had the same ASMR rating
as the first entrant when compared with an alternative ther-
apeutic class (i.e. the first and second entrants were deemed
to provide the same medical improvement vs an alternative
therapy). In rare instances, products with a high ASMR
rating were not considered to be me-too drugs if the mar-
ket’s perception differed widely from that of the HAS. Thus,
Lyrica, Afinitor and Valtrex were not classified as me-too
drugs for this analysis. In addition, a few me-too drugs
(Lunesta, Effient) were launched shortly before the first
entrant’s generics and were therefore excluded from the
analysis.
Finally, drugs dispensed via hospitals or specialty phar-
macies, or which are administered intravenously in physi-
cians’ offices, were not included in the analysis as
1 1999 was chosen for convenience because the FDAweb site does not
provide electronic annual approval files before that date.
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prescription information is not reliable for them. This data
limitation excludes most hospital, oncology and biologic
drugs from the analysis.
2.3.2 Price discount
Price discounts of me-to drugs at launch were estimated
based on WACs in the USA [25].
2.3.3 Promotional investment
The share of voice (SoV) at launch was calculated. The SoV
was defined as the relative portion of promotional invest-
ment of the new entrant within the two-product market
composed of the incumbent and the me-too drug, according
to the equation:
SoVi ¼ Ii Ii þ Ij
 
where SoVi is the SoVof me-too drug i; Ii is the promotional
investment (including resources spent on physician/nurse
detailing, journals, events and DTC advertising) spent on
me-too drug i over the first 12 months; and Ij is the promo-
tional investment in the innovator drug j over the same
period. A period of 12 months was chosen since Corstjens
and colleagues (2005) showed that the sales performance
over the first 4 quarters determines 81 % of the variance in
sales in the long term [28]. The impact of the second year’s
promotional investment is estimated in the Section 3.3.
2.3.4 Market share
The number of prescriptions (TRx) was used to calculate
monthly market share, which was defined as:
MSi;t ¼ TRxi;t TRxi;t þ TRxj;t
 
where MSi,t is the market share of me-too drug i during
month t; TRxi,t is the number of prescriptions filled for me-
too drug i during month t; and TRxj,t is the number of
prescriptions of the innovator drug j during month t.
Since products have different adoption patterns and the
time to reach their full potential varies, peak share was used
for the analysis rather than the share per time period. As
multiple events occur within the product’s lifetime (such as
new indications), peak share was calculated over the first
4 years of sales; therefore, peak share was defined as:
Max
t48 m
MSi;t
Different calculations were used in two particular cases: (1)
average share over 4 years was used for products launched in
the same quarter (e.g. Actos/Avandia; Zestril/Prinivil); (2)
TRx for the first 4 years were not available for Zyrtec/Allegra,
so share at 5 years was used.
2.3.5 Delay in launch of me-too drugs
The delay was expressed in quarters and capped at 15
quarters. The validation of this assumption is discussed in
Section 2.6.
2.4 Core methodology
Cumulative savings for payers generated by me-too drugs
were assessed using the equation:
Ci ¼
X
t
Di  Pj  Sharei;t MktTRxi;t ð1Þ
where Sharei,t is the share of me-too drug i during the period
t; MktTRxi,t is the TRx in product i’s market during the
period t; Pj is the price of innovator j; and Di is the price
of me-too i relative to the innovator calculated as:
Di ¼ Pi  Pið Þ Pj

To estimate Sharei, the following regression was run:
Sharei ¼ a þ b* ln 1þ SoVið Þ þ g  Ti þ "i
with "i ~ N 0;σ
2
  ð2Þ
where SoVi is the share of voice of me-too i at launch; Ti is
the launch delay between product i and the innovator drug,
and εi is the unobserved error term. Running the regression
based on share (rather than actual prescriptions) avoids
overweighting markets with high prescription volume. A
logarithmic function for promotion was used because a
decreasing return on promotion was expected.
To estimate price Di, the following model was used:
Di ¼ D0 þ 1  Ti þ "’i with "’i ~ N 0;σ’2ð Þ ð3Þ
where Di is the price of product i at launch, relative to the
innovator drug and ε’i is the unobserved error term. Note
that, over time, the relative price level may not remain
constant. In particular, first and second entrants are unlikely
to increase prices at exactly the same time. However, choos-
ing to apply the discount at launch simplifies the analysis
and the interpretation of the results.
The share and the price models could have been run
concomitantly (using Eq. (1)). However, equation [2] was
evaluated independently because the price is set before the
peak market share is known. The impact of price on peak-
share potential was analysed in the market-share model
specification.
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Regressions were run using the statistical analysis pro-
grams Stata (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA) and
R (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
2.5 Model validation
As the models rely on least-square estimates with a small
number of observations, the following tests were used to
ensure ordinary least-square assumptions for finite samples
were not violated: (1) White test (homoscedasticity); (2)
Ramsey RESET test (functional form of the conditional
mean); (3) Shapiro–Wilk W test (normality of residuals);
(4) variance inflation factor (absence of multicollinearity);
(5) residuals versus predicted value plot (exogeneity).
2.6 Market-share model specification
A number of variables were added to the model, including
the impact of price discounts and a comparison of the impact
of SoV in the first and second years. It is conceivable that
the longer a second entrant is delayed, the more important
the SoV is in driving market share. Therefore, an interaction
variable between launch delay and ln(1 + SoV) was intro-
duced to test this hypothesis. An annual trend variable was
included to elucidate whether the environment became more
or less favourable for the me-too drugs over time.
In the core model, the impact of delay on market share
was assumed to be a linear function when the launch delay
was 15 quarters or less and was capped if the delay
exceeded 15 quarters. With this assumption, once a certain
level of delay was reached, an additional delay would not
have a material impact on the potential of the me-too drug.
A penalised spline regression was used to justify this as-
sumption (data not shown).
2.7 Payer’s perspective
The cost savings of me-too drugs as a function of price
discount, launch timing and SoV were modelled in a market
behaving similarly to the average market in the sample: TRx
potential of approximately 6 million per quarter, innovator’s
WAC per TRx at $150 (medianWAC/TRx for the sample was
$133 and average price was $170 as of December 2009). The
second entrant was assumed to launch with an average SoV
derived from the sample. The launch delay (10 quarters) was
also derived from the sample. Given the uncertainties regard-
ing price discounts (see section 4), three price-discount levels
were assumed for the second entrant: 5 % (similar to the
average in the sample), 10 % and 15 %. Peak shares for all
scenarios were estimated from the analysis described above.
Based on the sample, the first and second entrants were
assumed to have become generic after 13 years on the
market. Generic exclusivity was assumed to last for
6 months. After that, multiple generic products were as-
sumed to have been launched. Generic versions of the first
entrant were assumed to capture 95 % of the first entrant’s
TRx within a year (based on the generics’ uptake of Zocor,
Prilosec, Claritin and Flonase) but were assumed not to take
market share away from the me-too drug. The final assump-
tion reflects the historical lack of impact of generics on the
non-generic brands [29].
During the generic exclusivity period (180 days), generic
prices were assumed to be 15 % below that of the branded
drug; afterwards, the price was assumed to decrease rapidly
to 10 % of the branded drug’s price. A 9 % discount rate was
assumed for both pharmaceutical companies and private
insurance companies [30].
Sensitivity analyses were conducted regarding launch de-
lay, SoV, duration of patents (for innovators andme-too drugs)
and the impact of the first entrant’s generics on the sales of me-
too drugs. No sensitivity analyseswere conducted for discount
rate, me-too uptake, generics pricing, market size or average
price of the incumbent.
2.8 Societal perspective
The US health insurance market was assumed to be perfect-
ly competitive and payers’ savings were passed entirely on
to consumers (otherwise, the zero-profit assumption is vio-
lated). The producer surplus is the excess of revenue over
total variable costs [31]. When a second entrant decides to
launch a me-too drug, the variable costs are related to
promotional investment and product; however, the research
and development costs are sunk and are not variable.
The economic surplus is the sum of the consumers’ and
producers’ surplus:
RP0
P1
DðPÞdP þ D1  P1  D0  P0 ΔVC
where D0, P0 are the average demand and price before the
me-too is launched. D1, P1 are the average demand and price
after the me-too is launched. ΔVC are the increase in vari-
able costs generated by the launch of the second entrant.
2.9 Impact of me-too drugs on market growth
A before and after approach was used to assess new en-
trants’ impact on market growth. Two monthly variables
were introduced as independent variables: a time trend var-
iable and a second variable that captured the new entrant’s
impact, which was zero before the new entrant launched and
was increased by one unit per month after the new entrant
launches. It was not possible to use this approach for all
markets because the entry of a third or fourth product
confounds the results in most markets. In addition, the time
difference between the first and second entrants’ launches
was sometimes not sufficient to establish robust before and
after trends.
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3 Results
Overall, 27 products were identified as second entrants with
limited differentiation (Table 1). The ‘average’ me-too drug
was launched 2.5 years (10 quarters) after the first entrant,
with a 54 % SoV and a 4 % WAC discount, and captured
38.5 % of market share.
The results of the regression analysis for Eqs. (2) and (3)
are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
3.1 Peak market share
The impact of SoVon the peak market share is highly signif-
icant (p<0.001). An increase of 1 % in (1+SoV) leads, on
average, to a peak share increase of 0.758 of a percentage
point. The launch delay variable was found to be significant in
both the market share model (p<0.001) and the price model
(p<0.05). Each additional delay of one quarter reduced the
peak share potential by 1.1 percentage points (p<0.001) and
the price potential by 0.6 percentage points (p<0.05). Second-
entrant delay (in quarters) multiplied by 1.1 % represents the
actual first-mover advantage expressed in market-share
points.
The model predicted an average peak share of 38.7 % (vs an
actual share of 38.5 %; Table 1). A few products achieved a
share substantially higher or lower than predicted: Zoloft (actual
share +7 percentage points vs predicted), Reyataz (+7 points),
Foradil (+6 points), Allegra D (+7 points), Femara (−11 points),
Exelon (−9 points), Symbicort (−7 points), Onglyza (−6 points)
and Zomig (−6 points).
If a product launched very late (e.g. 15 quarters later than
the incumbent) without any promotional investment, one
would expect its market share to be minimal and, indeed,
the model predicted a peak share of less than 1 %.
3.2 Model validation
Results from the White, Ramsey and Shapiro–Wilk W tests
(p=0.47, p=0.25 and p=0.33, respectively), the value of the
variance inflation factor (1.0), and the lack of relationships
between residuals and fitted values (Fig. 1), indicated that
the ordinary least-square finite sample assumptions were not
violated.
The results changed slightly when Zestril was assumed to
be a me-too of Prinivil, The intercept was 0.15 (p=0.02) and
the coefficient of the ln(1 + SoV) was 0.793 (p=0.000) and
the coefficient for the launch delay did not change. The
impact of removing the points whose leverage value was
at least twice as high as the average is shown in Table 2. In
practice, three observations (Prinivil/Zestril, Actos and
Starlix) were removed. The significance and the magnitude
of the coefficients of delay and SoVare comparable to those
in Table 2. No observations were found to be influential (i.e.
Cook’s distance > 4/N, where N is the number of observa-
tions in the dataset).
3.3 Market share model specification
Table 2 presents the impact of adding covariates to the core
model. Price discountwas not found to be a significant variable
for market share (p=0.77). SoVin the second year did not have
a significant impact on the peak share potential (p=0.42). The
time trend coefficient was negative but was only significant if
the significance threshold was raised to 10 % (p=0.063).
Given the low number of observations, a significance level of
10 % is acceptable. The sign of the trend variable showed that
the first-in-class drug’s advantage increased over time. When
the interaction variable between launch delay and ln(1 + SoV)
was introduced, ln(1 + SoV) and the interaction coefficients
were not individually significant but were jointly significant
(Chow test p<0.001). The interaction variable added marginal
information to the core model (Akaike’s Information Criterion
[AIC] of −80.0 vs −78.2).
3.4 Payer’s perspective: cost-saving estimates
Regardless of price discount assumptions, the cumulative
savings from me-too drugs were found to be minimal in the
first quarters because the second entrant’s share was mini-
mal (Fig. 2a). The cumulative, discounted savings peak
occurred before the first entrant became generic, and were
over $1000 million if the launch price was 15 % below the
incumbent’s price. After the first entrant becomes generic,
the savings decrease because the second entrant becomes
more expensive than the generics. Given the aggressive
pricing strategies for generics, savings decreased rapidly
and only amounted to $450 million over the me-too drug’s
lifecycle. If the price discount was less than 10 %, cumula-
tive savings generated by the second product were negative
over the lifetime of the me-too drug.
Assuming a 15 % price discount, the savings for payers
from products launched with 69 % SoV were 18 % higher
than those generated by products launched with 54 % SoV,
while the savings from products launched with 39 % SoV
were 20 % lower (Fig. 2b).
The results of the sensitivity analysis around launch delay
are shown in Fig. 2c. Assuming a higher price discount for
late entrants (0.6 % for each quarter; Table 3), late me-too
drugs generated higher savings than early me-too drugs in
the first few years but had less value over their lifetime.
The price discount necessary for a me-too drug to be cost
saving was marginal if the me-too drug was launched a few
quarters after the pioneer. However, if the me-too drug was
delayed by 5 years, a price discount of 23 % CI: 17 %–35 %
was necessary (Fig. 3). This is because the me-too drug pre-
vents generic utilization for a long period after the first entrant
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loses patent. The number of years with patent protection is
uncertain and varies across drugs, so a confidence interval for
the required price discounts was created based on 20 000
simulations (1000 for each quarter of delay). The results of
the simulations show that a price discount of up to 35 % may
be required for a late me-too drug to be cost saving (Fig. 3).
Managed care organizations have become more aggressive in
managing brands’ prescriptions once an innovator loses pat-
ent. For instance, Lipitor’s market share decreased by an
additional 0.01 % (0.004 point) per month after Pravachol’s
generics were introduced (data not shown). When overlaying
a similar share decrease for me-toos once the innovator lost
Table 1 ‘Me-too’ drugs selected for analysis
1st
entrant
2nd entrant ASMR ratinga US
launch
Launch delay
(quarter)
Relative WAC at
launch (%)
Peak share
(%)
Launch SoV
(%)
Celebrex Vioxx Same as Celebrex May 1999 1 0 49 51
Imitrex Zomig None vs Imitrex Dec 1997 15 −12 21 42
Claritin Zyrtec None vs Claritin Jan 1996 11 −9 39 55
Cozaar Diovan V Feb 1997 7 −3 48 68
Fosamax Actonel None vs Fosamax Apr 2000 15 −10 33 53
Mevacor Pravachol Not availableb Nov 1991 15 −9 39 66
Prilosec Prevacid None vs Prilosec May 1995 15 −8 37 54
Serevent Foradil None vs Serevent May 2001 15 −8 31 38
Prozac Zoloft None vs Prozac Feb 1992 15 −2 45 63
Aricept Exelon IV (same as Aricept) May 2000 13 4 24 49
Avandia Actos V (same as Avandia) Jul 1999 0 16 45 40
Zestril Prinivil Same molecule Jan 1988 0 0 45 37
Risperdal Zyprexa IV vs Risperdal Oct 1996 11 −6 45 58
Flonase Nasonex IV (same as Flonase) Oct 1997 11 −2 42 54
Claritin D Allegra-D Same as Claritin D Jan 1998 13 −18 34 37
Claritin Zyrtec + Allegra Same as Claritin Jan 1996 11 −9 43 64
Viagra Cialis + Levitra V vs Viagra Aug 2003 15 −5 44 70
Humalog Novolog V vs Humalog Sep 2001 15 −8 23 37
Exforge Azor Same as Exforge Oct 2007 1 −2 43 46
Concerta M-CD + Add-XR Similar moleculec May 2001 3 0 54 74
Advair Symbicort IV (same as Advair) Jun 2007 15 −11 20 43
Januvia Onglyza V (same as Januvia) Aug 2009 11 0 31 53
Lantus Levemir Same as Lantus Mar 2006 15 2 19 37
Sprycel Tasigna Same as Sprycel Nov 2007 5 −16 50 69
Kaletra Reyataz Same as Kaletra Jun 2003 11 23 49 63
Arimidex Femara Same as Arimidex Jul 1997 6 0 36 63
Prandin Starlix Same as Prandin Feb 2001 11 −6 50 86
Average 10 −4 38 54
Median 11 −5 42 54
Minimum 0 −18 19 37
Maximum 15 +18 54 86
No. of observations 27 27 27 27
Sources: French HAS [22], IMS [23], SDI Health [24], First Databank [25]
ASMR Amélioration du Service Médical Rendu (evaluation of therapeutic benefit), M-CD + Add-XR Metadate CD + Adderall-XR, SoV Share of
voice, WAC Wholesaler acquisition cost
a Same: the French HAS determined that the second entrant shares the same improvement benefits as the first entrant; None: HAS determined that
the second entrant does not bring any additional benefits compared with the first entrant
b Pravachol was not evaluated against the first entrant (Mevacor) by HAS, since Mevacor was not launched in France. The author’s judgement of
ASMR rating was used
cMetadate CD and Concerta are both methylphenidate hydrochloride with extended release formulation. Concerta and Adderall XR have similar
efficacy and side effects
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patents, the results of the simulations showed that the a price
discount of 21% (95%CI: 16%–32%) for a late me-too drug
(i.e. delayed by 5 years). Therefore, managed care interven-
tion only slightly increases the value of me-too drugs.
3.5 Impact of me-too drugs on market growth
The results of the analysis of new entrants’ impact on market
growth for the erectile dysfunction and the sleeping aid mar-
kets are presented in Table 4 and Fig. 4. In both markets, the
before and after trend variables were highly significant. The
erectile dysfunction market grew at a rate of 11 000 TRx per
month and the sleeping aid market at 20 600 TRx per month
before new entrants entered the market. However, the markets
had opposite growth patterns after the new launches. The
market growth increased by 30 500 TRx per month for the
sleeping aid market but decreased by 7500 TRx per month in
the erectile dysfunction market. One potential explanation for
the decrease in TRx for erectile dysfunction drugs was a scare
linking them to blindness in 2005 [32]. If the analysis was
halted at the end of 2004, the trend after second entrant launch
coefficient was positive but insignificant.
3.6 Societal perspective
Using the assumptions described in Section 2.7. and assum-
ing that the me-too launch price is 15 % below the
incumbent’s price, the cumulative increase in consumer
surplus is approximately $525 million regardless of the
market growth (i.e. for sleep or erectile dysfunction mar-
kets). The change in producers’ surplus depends on market
growth assumptions. If the market does not grow, the pro-
ducers’ surplus decreases by $525 million plus any addi-
tional variable costs. The economic surplus always
decreases since no incumbent decreased promotional invest-
ments when competition entered the market. If the market
grows at the same rate as the sleep market (approximately
20 % incremental growth after 24 months), the producers’
surplus grows by $3500 million minus any increase in
variable costs. The launch of a me-too drug increases the
economic surplus only if the increase in variable costs does
not exceed $4075 million over the life of the me-too drug
(i.e. approximately $300 million per year). This was not the
case for the sleep market since SDI health reported that the
promotional investments increased by $700 million a year
after the introduction of me-toos.
4 Discussion
4.1 Pharmaceutical companies’ perspective
The model has enabled an objective analysis of several of
the factors influencing the success of me-too drugs. A
number of observations can be made based on the model’s
output.
Some products performed much better (or worse) in
reality than predicted by the model. There could be a num-
ber of explanations for this, for example the ability to
differentiate or the competition’s focus.
With regard to the delay between launch of the first
entrant and the me-too drug, the longer a second entrant is
delayed, the less share it is likely to capture and the lower its
Table 2 Coefficient estimates: second-entrant peak share model results
Basic
model
Basic model without
leverage
With price
discount
With 2nd year
SoV
With
interaction
With time
trend
Constant (%) 17.3** 9.7 17.2** 15.5* 34.5** 21.8***
Delay vs 1st entrant (%) −1.1*** −0.9** −1.1*** −1.2*** −2.8** −1.1***
ln(1 + SoV) (%) 75.8*** 87.6*** 75.8*** 68.7*** 32.6 75.0***
ln(1 + SoV2ndyear) (%) 12.8
Price discount (%) 4.1
Delay*ln(1 + SoV) (%) 4.3
Time trend (years) (%) −0.4
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.77
Observations 27 24 27 27 27 27
SoV Share of voice
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table 3 Coefficient estimates: second-entrant price model results
Coefficient (%) Standard error p-value
Constant 2.5 0.033 0.451
Delay vs 1st entrant −0.6* 0.003 0.041
R2 =16 %; adjusted R2 =12 %
*p<0.05
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price. The first entrant is therefore better established, and the
ability of a me-too drug to gain market share is reduced and
payers are more likely to demand a lower price to reimburse
the product.
It is possible for pharmaceutical companies to offset
launch delays with an increased SoV to achieve a target
market share. The required increase in SoV can be calculat-
ed by differentiating Eq. (2) assuming the peak share target
remains constant. The formula to offset a delay is:
dSoV 1þ SoVð Þ= ¼ g b=ð Þ  dT ð4Þ
By using the regression coefficients in Table 2,
dSoV 1þ SoVð Þ= ¼ 1:48%  dT ð5Þ
For instance, a company planning to launch a me-too
drug with a 50 % SoV and facing a one-quarter delay has
to increase its SoV to 52.2 % to reach the same peak share
that would have been achieved without the delay. Therefore,
the company will have to increase the planned promotional
investment by 9.2 %. Approval delays can therefore be very
costly for companies.
It is worth noting that the constant in the price model is
not significant: if the first entrant and the second entrant
launch within the same quarter, prices are expected to be
equivalent, which makes intuitive sense (Table 3).
The implications of the results presented in Tables 2 and 3
are fundamental for the pharmaceutical industry, if the results
are generalized beyond the analysed time-frame (more on this
in Section 4.2.3.). To gain market share, pharmaceutical com-
panies should focus on promotional investments. Investing at
the appropriate level over the first 12 months after launch
greatly influenced the success of the drug. More specifically,
the model can help pharmaceutical companies to determine
the promotional investment that maximises profits and to
understand whether investing in research for a me-too drug
is commercially sound. As the adjusted R2 in the peak share
model is 0.74, other factors account for at most 26 % of the
success. The level of promotional investment, rather than its
quality, seems to matter most. This point is further discussed
in Section 4.6.
4.2 Market share model specification
4.2.1 Price discount impact
Price discount was found not to be a significant variable for
market share. In other words, it cannot be shown that in-
creasing the price discount at launch helps a product to
increase its market share potential. A feasible explanation
is that physicians and patients are not usually exposed to the
actual price of the drugs. In general, physicians do not pay
for the drugs and patients’ co-payments are typically not
linked to drug prices (with the exception of co-insurance).
Also, price cannot be considered as a competitive advantage
as the price of the first entrant can easily be lowered to
match that of the second entrant. The implication of this
finding is that aggressive pricing is not recommended as it
does not significantly impact share. However, managed care
organisations seem to have become more aggressive in
managing prices recently, and the impact of pricing deci-
sions may increase in the future.
4.2.2 Share of voice: first year versus second year impact
Although the model predicted that a company’s promotional
investment level in the second year does not have a signif-
icant impact on the peak share potential, it should be noted
that one cannot conclude that companies should only invest
for 12 months and then stop promotion as no companies
have experimented with such a promotional investment
pattern.
Fig. 1 Residuals versus
predicted market shares
308 S. Régnier
Fig. 2 Impact on payers’
cumulative savings of (a) price
discount, (b) launch share of
voice, and (c) launch date
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4.2.3 Time trend
The time trend coefficient was negative, meaning that the
first in class’s advantage increased over time. In other
words, and with everything else being equal, it was better
on average for a me-too drug to launch in the 1990s than in
the 2000s. One potential explanation is the increasing im-
pact of managed care organisations influencing sales. Over
time, managed care organisations have become more and
more effective in managing formularies and influencing
physician’s prescribing patterns. For instance, Express
Scripts, one of the largest pharmacy benefit management
companies in the USA, erased Lipitor from its list of pre-
ferred drugs in 2005 [33]. The intent was clearly to entice
patients to use a competitor, Zocor (simvastatin), which was
soon to become generic. It should be noted that the time
trend coefficient is not significant. This may be due to the
low number of products recently launched in the sample.
4.3 Payer’s perspective
The median list price discount observed in the model (4 %)
is not sufficient for a me-too drug to be cost saving. Addi-
tional rebates beyond the list price discount are necessary to
ensure that savings are generated over the lifetime of the
product.
As savings depend on SoV, price discount and launch
delay, payers should consider these three variables when
evaluating me-too drugs. For instance, they could calculate
the rebates necessary to ensure that a new entrant will be
cost saving over its lifecycle.
A late me-too drug represents an expensive alternative to
the incumbent’s generic over a longer timeframe. In partic-
ular, the cumulative savings are negative for me-too drugs
launched 5 years after the first entrant, even if sold at a price
21 % below that of the first entrant, unless managed care
organisations are able to drive generic utilisation in the
market.
4.4 Impact on market growth
Market growth could represent a cost or a saving for payers.
While incremental market growth generates additional drug
costs, it could also represent a benefit if incremental usage is
directed towards appropriate patients. The introduction of
new sleeping aids considerably increased the size of the
market but it is unclear whether this increase was driven
by an increase in diagnoses of sleeping disorders or “disease
Fig. 3 Price discount required
for a me-too drug to be cost
saving
Table 4 Impact of new entrants on market growth (before and after analysis)
Sleeping aida Erectile dysfunctionb Erectile dysfunction (until Dec 2004)
TRx constant (×1000) 2335.6*** 1114.5*** 1126.4***
Trend before 2nd entrant launch (TRx/month) 20.6*** 11.0*** 9.8***
Trend after 2nd entrant launch (TRx/month) 30.5*** −7.5*** 1.6
TRx Number of prescriptions
***p<0.001
a Prais-Winsten regression was used to correct for the errors’ serial correlation [“prais” procedure was used in Stata]
b A regression with robust estimator of variances was used to correct for heteroscedasticity [“vce(robust)” option was used in Stata]
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mongering”. The impact of DTC promotion can be seen as
an insightful analogue. Some studies show that DTC adver-
tising can increase compliance and the likelihood that pa-
tients receive the appropriate treatment [34, 35]. However, it
might also increase overuse and off-label use [34].
4.5 Impact of using the FDA instead of the HAS ratings
Out of the 27 products in the sample, all but three went
through the FDA’s standard review process. The priority
review status of Vioxx and Actos is not incompatible with
a me-too classification since their approvals were within
1 month of Celebrex and Avandia. Kaletra would be exclud-
ed from the sample if the FDA classification was used.
All second entrants approved by the FDA from 1999 to 2007
were screened and classified as potential me-too drugs if they
went through a standard review process were dispensed at a
pharmacy and sales were reported. Inspra and Pylera were the
only potential me-toos that were not included in the sample
since Inspra received anASMRof III (vs. Aldactone) and Pylera
was not reviewed by the HAS. Therefore, using the HAS or
FDA classifications did not dramatically alter the sample.
4.6 Limitations
Several caveats and shortcomings should be considered with
regard to some of the data used in this study. Firstly,
although ex-factory prices are publicly available, any re-
bates offered by manufacturers to secure reimbursement
are not disclosed; therefore, the actual prices paid by payers
cannot always be accurately assessed. In an effort to create a
perception of differentiation, pharmaceutical companies try
Fig. 4 Before-and-after
analysis: impact of new entrants
in (a) erectile dysfunction and
(b) sleeping aid markets
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to differentiate me-too drugs from existing options by
targeting different patient segments or different points in
the therapy algorithm, or by conducting DTC advertising.
The IMS and SDI Health data are based on sampling. A
small sample size can make the estimate unstable, and
caution should be used when interpreting SoV because the
corresponding confidence intervals could be large.
As discussed above, me-too drugs may provide additional
benefits to some patients and, therefore, may bring more than
cost savings. However, the quantification of those benefits is
not readily available and could not be incorporated in the
model.
The model could suffer from the following biases: (1)
Bias due to measurement. Survey data are prone to mea-
surement error and the level of promotional investments
may not be accurately recorded which would bias the re-
gression coefficients downward. The model estimated share
as a function of a constant, promotional investment, time
delay and an error term ε. Quality of the promotional in-
vestment is not reported and, if quality impacts share, it is
part of the error term ε. It is plausible that physicians might
over-report the quantity of promotional investment for prod-
ucts with effective promotional campaigns. In other words,
the quality (unmeasured) and the quantity (measured) of the
promotional investment might be correlated. In that case, the
error term ε and the independent variable (promotional
investment) would be correlated. This would be a violation
of the OLS assumptions and the regression coefficients
would be biased. A possible solution to these issues is to
gather data directly from pharmaceutical companies. (2)
Causality bias. It was assumed that SoV drives market share
but it is also plausible that manufacturers’ expectations of
market share drive launch promotional investment deci-
sions. However, we do not believe that causality is an issue
as it is unlikely that manufacturers can identify products
with high potential share a priori, given the limited differ-
entiation of me-too drugs.
The analysis was conducted for products sold in the retail
channel. For products sold by specialty pharmacies or hospi-
tals, the results may differ from those presented in this paper.
5 Conclusions
Me-too drugs have a substantial market impact and can rep-
resent considerable sales potential for pharmaceutical compa-
nies. On average, they launch with 20 % more resources than
the incumbents and they capture 38 % of market share within
4 years. The model allowed an objective analysis of some of
the factors that impact on the success or otherwise of me-too
drugs. The peak market share depends on the promotional
investment at launch and the length of the innovator drug’s
launch advantage. Me-too drugs are introduced at a reduced
price compared to incumbent products. The magnitude of the
discount depends on the delay between the launch of the
incumbent and the me-too drug; however, the price discount
does not have a significant impact on market share. In other
words, manufacturers’ pricing decisions within the customary
range do not impact on the potential market share.
In certain circumstances, me-too drugs are cost saving for
payers. Namely, price discounts have to be sufficient and
me-too drugs have to be launched within a few years after
the first entrant. If me-too drugs are launched late, they
could save payers money in the short and medium term,
but could represent a cost in the long term, as they prevent
conversion to low-priced alternatives after the first entrant
becomes generic. Managed care organisations can increase
the overall value of me-too drugs by providing incentives to
switch from me-too drugs to generic versions of the first
entrants. The tactics used by some managed care organiza-
tions to convert Lipitor utilization to generic simvastatin can
be used to increase the value of me-toos [33]. In all scenar-
ios analysed, cost savings are small in the first 2 years of the
me-too product’s lifecycle. Therefore, if managed care or-
ganisations have a short-term financial focus, me-too drugs
do not offer financial benefits and only provide additional
treatment choices to physicians and patients.
To further assess the value of me-too drugs, a similar
analysis could be conducted for hospital products and for
products launched as third or fourth entrants into the market.
A cross-sectional time-series analysis of R&D investment
decision could shed more light on the impact that me-too
drugs have on innovation.
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